Explaining Asset Prices with External Habits and Wage
Rigidities in a DSGE Model.
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This paper is a progress report on understanding the relationship between prices and allocations of risks on financial markets versus macroeconomic choices and allocations. In this paper, I investigate the scope of a model with exogenous habit formation -or "catching up with the Joneses", see Abel (1990) -to generate the observed equity premium as well as other key macroeconomic facts. Along the way, I derive restrictions for four out of eight parameters for a rather general preference specification of habit formation by imposing consistency with long-run growth, the leisure share, the aggregate Frisch elasticity of labor supply, the observed risk-free rate, and the observed Sharpe ratio.
The high reward for holding risk on financial markets implies that the stochastic discount factor of the marginal investor shows large fluctuations, which are highly correlated with aggregate risk. Models with a representative agent -to which this paper belongs -therefore require, that risk aversion, measured appropriately, must be high. That alone, however is not enough: when economic choices are endogenous, agents typically have the possibility to insulate the risk-sensitive dimensions of their preferences against aggregate risk.
Thus, the literature on generating both asset pricing facts as well as macroeconomic facts within one model has increasingly pointed to labor mar- 
The model
I shall use small letters to denote the choices of an individual agent, and capital letters to denote economy-wide averages per agent. Production is organized by firms, hiring labor and renting capital from households at a market wage W t and a market dividend D t . I assume that production is competitive and follows a Cobb-Douglas production function,
and therefore
Technology z t evolves according to a random walk with drift,
where I shall assume in the linearized version of the model, that ǫ t is normally iid with standard deviation σ ǫ .
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A representative agent has preferences given by
where c t and l t denote consumption and leisure, and β, ν, η, A are parameters, satisfying ν > 0, η > ν/(ν + 1) to assure monotonicity and concavity on the domain. She is endowed with initial capital k −1 and one unit of time per period, which can be used as labor or leisure. She maximizes these preferences over choices of investment, consumption and labor, taking as given the "exogenous habits" of H t for consumption and F t for leisure as well as real wages W t for labor and dividends D t for providing capital to firms,
for some ξ > 0, see Jermann (1998) . The exogenous habits evolve according to
where C t and L t are aggregate average levels of consumption and leisure.
There is an extra constant γ in the specification for H t which is tied to the 3 productivity growth rate in (3). I do this for algebraic simplicity. Exogenous habits give rise to externalities, which may be corrected with taxes, see Ljungqvist and Uhlig (2000) : I shall ignore this issue here.
I assume that labor markets are demand constrained. The usual firstorder condition of the agent for supplying labor would be
at the friction-free wage W f t . Due to some unmodelled friction, I assume that not all labor supply reaches the market. I assume that the steady state supply of labor is fixed at some exogenously imposed level below the level of the frictionless economy. Locally around the steady state, households are therefore willing to supply labor at the going market wage, assumed to be governed by
for some ω ≥ 0. This is a real wage ridity as recently postulated by e.g.
Hall (2005) and Shimer (2005) . The particular specification here follows Blanchard and Gali (2005) . Note that the frictionless scenario is included as a special case for µ = 0 = ω.
An equilibrium is defined in the usual way, except for imposing that labor markets are demand-constrained. In particular, individual choices will coincide with aggregate choices, e.g. c t = C t , and I shall now drop the distinction between the two. One can show that there is a steady state in the productivity-detrended variablesC t = C t / exp(z t−1 ) and similarlyH t ,
and the stationary variables L t , F t , N t . I denote this steady state with bars.
Assuming that t counts quarters, I shall set δ = 0.015, γ = 0.0075, θ = 0.33, as is common, implying a nonstochastic growth rate of 3% per year. I shall also impose on my choice of preferences parameters, that they are consistent with a nonstochastic return ofR = 1.01 and a share of time spent as leisure asL = 2/3. With this, compute e.g.
which will be useful below. The eight preference parameters (A, β, η, ν, χ, ζ, ψ, φ) shall now be constrained by two assumptions already made and by two further observations: the Frisch elasticity of labor supply and the Sharpe ratio.
2 Constraints on preferences
Macroeconomic constraints
Consider a more general preference specification with a per-period felicity function u(c t −H t , l t −F t ). Impose that leisure is constant along the balanced growth path. This implies that
for some function v(·) and up to the intercept and scaling. For a loglinear approximation, the derivatives of log v(·) and log v ′ (·) around the steady state characterize this function sufficiently. In my specification, I
set v(l t − F t ) = A + (l t − F t ) ν . Thus, my habit preference specification is general up to a second-order approximation, subject to obeying the balanced growth condition for preferences of the form (15). For algebraic convenience,
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Comparing the marginal utility of leisure with its marginal opportunity
where the inequality ought to be strict in order to induce the labor market to be demand-constrained, and where the latter equality derives from the firstorder conditions of the firm and steady state substitutions. This equation
as well as, equivalently,
Let τ be the Frisch elasticity of labor supply, which I shall treat here as the elasticity of desired labor supply with respect to a change in the frictionless wage, holding marginal utility of consumption constant. Given preference parameters χ and η, define
After some calculation, I obtain the second constraint
I will use this equation to calculate the implied value for ν. Note that ν > 0 for all ψ ∈ [0, 1), χ ∈ [0, 1) and η > 1, if τ > τ = (1 −N )κ/(N (κ + 1)).
Asset pricing constraints
Let R t+1 be the return on some asset between period t and t + 1. The Lucas asset pricing equation is
For the nonstochastic growth path (although not for the average risk-free rate in the stochastic economy), this implies the third constraint
Define the news,
and define similarly ǫ R,t+1 , ǫ c,t+1 and ǫ l,t+1 . Let σ λ , σ R , ρ λ,R be the standard deviations of ǫ λ,t+1 and ǫ R,t+1 and their correlation. Define similarly σ c , σ l and ρ c,l . I assume homoskedasticity throughout. Let r f t be the logarithm of the risk-free return from t to t + 1. Define the Sharpe ratio (4) can generate an ill-defined maximization problem, unless 7 the shock process is sufficiently restricted. Resolving these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Rather, these remarks shall serve as a caveat for the log-linear approach pursued here. This approach has the advantage of being well-understood and imposing a tight discipline on the exercise.
To a log-linear approximation, ǫ λ,t+1 = −ηǫ c,t+1 +νǫ l,t+1 (29) Equation (28) therefore implies a quadratic equation inη andν,
which is my forth constraint. Note thatν = 0, ifησ c = S, which is the benchmark case of no influence of leisure on asset pricing, and holds for separable preferences, η = 1.
3 Numerical strategy and results
Parameterization
The observations above constrain the preference parameters (α, β, η, ν, χ, ψ), In summary, a DSGE model with (exogenous and lagged) habits in both leisure and consumption, but not necessarily with additional persistence, is well capable of matching the observed asset market facts as well as macro facts, provided one allows for moderate real wage stickiness and provided one allows for sufficient curvature on preferences, as dictated by the asset market observations. Without wage stickiness, delivery on both the asset pricing implications as well as the macroeconomic implications seems to be much harder.
